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A REAPPRAISAL OF THE ROLE OF DISCLOSURE 
Robert L. Knauss* 
T HE Report of Special Study of Securities Markets
1 contains 
the following statements on the role of disclosure: 
"The keystone of the entire structure of Federal securities 
legislation is disclosure."2 
"The Commission's functions and responsibilities under 
the two basic securities laws are broadly of two types: first, 
to preside over the processes of disclosure, especially by 
issuers of securities, upon which these laws so basically rely; 
and second, to regulate substantive conduct in the securities 
market, both directly, and by supervision of industry self-
regulation. " 3 
These statements should be compared with that found in the 
leading textbook on securities regulation: "Then too, there is the 
recurrent theme throughout these statutes of disclosure, again 
disclosure, and still more disclosure."4 
Disclosure, however, is not a simple method of regulation 
having universal application and universal effectiveness. It as-
sumes a different role and meaning depending on the information 
to be disclosed, the party on whom the obligation of disclosure 
rests, and the parties for whom the information is intended. The 
objective of this paper is to assess the current role of disclosure 
in its various aspects in security regulation. Following a brief 
description of the current uses of disclosure in securities regula-
tion, there are separate sections describing and evaluating (I) the 
obligation of disclosure imposed on issuers at the initial sale of 
securities, (2) the obligation of disclosure resting on issuers if they 
have securities which are traded, and (3) obligations of disclosure 
imposed on parties in the securities business other than issuers. 
This last section includes obligations of insiders, broker-dealers, 
and investment advisers, as well as duties of exchanges and over-
the-counter dealers to provide market data. A concluding section 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Professor Knauss was a mem-
ber of the Special Study of Securities Markets and is currently a Legal Consultant to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.-Ed. The views expressed herein are those of the 
author, do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, and except where specific 
reference is made do not reflect the findings or recommendations of the Special Study. 
1 Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter cited as Special Study]. 
2 Special Study pt. 3, at I. 
8 Special Study pt. 4, at 719. 
4 I Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 21 (2d ed. 1961). 
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discusses briefly the broader function of disclosure as a device to 
control internal corporate affairs. 
I. THE VARIOUS ROLES OF DISCLOSURE IN SECURITIES 
REGULATION 
The objective of the Securities Act of 19335-the "truth in 
securities" bill-was to require that any company selling securities 
to the public disclose factual data concerning the company. The 
requirements of disclosure are imposed on the selling companies 
and parties such as underwriters who sell on behalf of the com-
pany. The nature of the disclosure is that of a seller to a buyer. 
President Roosevelt stated in his message to Congress of March 
29, 1933: "This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, 
the further doctrine 'let the seller also beware.' It puts the burden 
of telling the whole truth on the seller."6 
Following the initial distribution and sale by the company, 
there is a change in the basis of the obligation of the company to 
disclose. When one investor sells securities to another through 
the facilities of an exchange or in the over-the-counter market, the 
company is not a part of the transaction, and receives no direct 
benefit. The Securities Exchange Act of 19347 provides that com-
panies the securities of which are listed on a national exchange 
must submit annual financial statements and other periodic re-
ports. 8 In addition, such companies must meet requirements es-
tablished by the Commission for the solicitation of proxies.9 These 
obligations do not arise from a buyer-seller relationship, but repre-
sent a continuing respon.sibility of the company as long as its 
securities are traded on a national exchange. An aspect related to 
the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act is the rule of 
most exchanges requiring that the exchange (and thus the public) 
be informed immediately of any unusual corporate activity.10 
These obligations of disclosure just mentioned rest on the 
company-the issuer of the securities and parties acting in its 
behalf.11 A broad and growing area of disclosure remains: the 
5 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963) [hereinafter cited as 
Securities Act]. 
6 Quoted in H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). 
7 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963) [hereinafter cited as 
Exchange Act]. 
s See the Exchange Act §§ 12, 13, 48 Stat. 892, 894 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m (1958). 
9 Exchange Act § 14, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1958). 
10 See NEW YORK. STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL A20-22 (1953). 
11 Under the Securities Act the obligation of disclosure in the initial distribution rests 
not only on the issuer, but also on individual officers and directors of the issuer and 
those held to be underwriters selling on behalf of the issuer. 
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requirements applicable to various participants in the securities 
business other than the issuer. Some of the requirements are ex-
pressly delineated by statute, and others have been formulated by 
Commission decision and regulations. It is in this area that the 
greatest growth in the role of disclosure is taking place. The Ex-
change Act imposes a positive requirement that all officers, direc-
tors, and those holding ten percent of the outstanding stock in a 
listed company disclose all trades which they make of the com-
pany's stock.12 This is an individual duty of each party as to every 
purchase or sale. 
There are also various disclosures required for other parties 
who purchase and sell securities. The anti-fraud provisions of the 
Exchange Act compel positive disclosure by all purchasers and 
sellers to an extent beyond that needed to avoid a common-law 
action of fraud.13 As the involvement of the party increases, his 
obligations increase. For example, a duty is imposed on a broker-
dealer to disclose the manner in which a transaction is executed,14 
as well as the existence of conflicts of interest arising because he 
has a direct interest in the security he is selling. Recent decisions, 
and the recommendations of the Special Study go farther and 
would impose a positive duty of disclosure in numerous other 
instances. 
Other participants in the securities markets, not involved di-
rectly in purchasing or selling, such as investment advisers, have 
been under pressure to make disclosure similar to that of broker-
dealers. The Commission has declared it fraudulent for an invest-
ment adviser not to disclose the fact he has taken a position in 
securities he recommends.15 Developing areas concern the need for 
the investment adviser to disclose the nature of his investigation 
and research, and the source of his information. Similar require-
ments of disclosure are in the developmental stage for corporate 
public relations men and others, such as magazine and newspaper 
editors, who are responsible for the appearance of financial infor-
mation concerning a company. 
A remaining aspect of disclosure involves the market-place 
itself. The exchanges have a responsibility to maintain accurate 
12 Exchange Act § 16(a), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1958). 
13 See text accompanying note 106 infra for duties of sellers and purchasers under the 
anti-fraud provisions. 
H See text accompanying note 101 infra for duties of broker-dealers under the anti-
fraud provisions. 
15 See text accompanying notes 138-44 infra for a delineation of the duties of invest-
ment advisers and public relations men. 
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reporting of current sales and volume of trading.16 One of the 
goals of the future development of the over-the-counter market is 
to provide current market data similar to that available for se-
curities traded on exchanges. 
The disclosure obligations of participants in the securities in-
dustry are a part of a larger regulatory pattern which has numerous 
direct restrictions and prohibitions. It is in these areas of restric-
tive control that "self-regulation" plays an important role. With 
regard to the issuers of securities, disclosure is the exclusive 
method of control. 
II. DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON ISSUERS IN THE 
INITIAL SALE OF SECURITIES 
Because of the nature of securities, a buyer cannot make an 
immediate value judgment, as he would with tangible items. He 
must look behind the piece of paper and examine the merits of 
the company which has issued the security. The buyer must of 
necessity rely on the information given to him and on material 
generally available from the company. The less information 
available, the less the market price will be representative of the 
security's true value and the greater will be the opportunity for 
fraud.17 The need for governmental regulation stems from this 
problem. The obligation of issuers of new securities to disclose 
financial and other data as required by the Securities Act of 1933 
originated largely in the English Company Acts. This obligation 
and its active enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission performs an invaluable function. Disclosure requirements 
alone, however, cannot protect investors in new securities from 
loss, and it should be recognized that serious problems remain in 
spite of the relative success of the Securities Act. A short descrip-
tion of these disclosure requirements and their background will 
permit a better understanding of the unsolved problems. 
A. History of the Issuance Requirements 
The English law recognized at an early point that some con-
trol was needed over companies selling securities to the public. 
The initial effort was the Bubble Act of 1719,18 which was enacted 
16 See text accompanying notes 145 &: 146 infra, relating to the reporting of market 
data. 
17 One of the first statements of this view appears in Twycross v. Grant, [1877] 2 
C.P. 469, 532. Similar language appears in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917), 
which upheld a regulatory Blue Sky Law. 
18 6 Geo. 1, c. 18. 
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following the spectacular stock frauds revealed in the bursting of 
the South Sea Bubble.19 This act was definitely regulatory, as it 
in effect prohibited joint-stock companies (corporations) alto-
gether. The prohibition proved unworkable. After several 
weakening amendments the act was completely repealed in 1825.20 
Stock frauds continued, and in response to public demand, the 
Gladstone Committee, first of several English committees to 
study the securities markets during the past 177 years,21 was ap-
pointed in 1841 "to inquire into the laws respecting joint-stock 
companies with a view to the greater security of the public."22 
The company act23 which followed the Gladstone Committee 
report was the real beginning of English corporation law; it had 
two basic objectives: (I) to obviate the evils of fraudulent and 
fictitious companies and (2) to protect the public from companies 
which, while not founded in fraud, were faulty in their nature 
because of unsound calculations and inadequate management. 
The answer to both problems, according to Gladstone, was to 
compel disclosure: "Publicity is all that is necessary. Show up the 
roguery and it is harmless."24 The mechanics to achieve this 
publicity were elementary in scope. All that was required was 
10 Parton, Caricature in the Hogarthian Period, Harper's New Monthly Magazine, 
June-Nov. 1875, p. 40, states that "besides the original South Sea Company which began 
the frenzy, there were started in the course of a few months about two hundred joint-
stock schemes, many of which, as given in Anderson's History of Commerce, are of almost 
incredible absurdity. The sum called for by these projects was three hundred millions of 
pounds sterling, which was more than the value of all the land in Great Britain. Shares 
in Sir Richard Steele's 'fish pool for bringing fresh fish to London' brought one hundred 
and sixty pounds a share! Men paid seventy pounds each for 'permits,' which gave them 
merely the privilege of subscribing to a sail-cloth manufacturing company not yet 
formed. There was, indeed, a great trade in 'permits' to subscribe to companies only 
planned. • • • The prices paid for shares during the half year of this mania were as 
remarkable as the schemes themselves. South Sea shares of a hundred pounds ·par value 
reached a thousand pounds. It was a poor share that did not sell at five times its original 
price. As in France, so in England, the long heads, like Sir Robert Walpole and Alexander 
Pope, began to think of 'realizing' when they had gained a thousand per cenL or so upon 
their ventures; and, in a very few days, realizing, in its tum, became a mania; and all 
those paper fortunes shrank and crumpled into nothingness." 
20 Companies Act, 1825, 6 Geo. 6, c. 91. 
21 The other committees formed to study the securities markets were (1) The Royal 
Commission of 1854 (Rickard's Report); (2) Lord Doney's Committee (1895); (3) Love-
bum's Committee (1906); (4) Greene's Committee (1926); (5) the Bodkin Committee 
(1937); (6) GREAT BRITAIN BOARD OF TRADE, REPORT OF THE COMMITIEE ON COMPANY 
LAW AMENDMENT (1945) [hereinafter cited as COHEN REPORT]; and (7) GREAT BRITAIN 
BOARD OF TRADE, COMPANY LAW CoMMITIEE REPORT (1962) [hereinafter cited as JENKINS 
REPORT]. 
22 A full discussion will be found in FORMOY, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN 
COMPANY LAW pt. 2, § 4 (1923), and HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORA· 
TION IN ENGLAND, 1800-1867, ch. 5 (1936). 
23 Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 &: 9 Viet., c. 16. 
2, Gladstone in the House of Commons {HANSARD, LXXV [1844] 277), quoted by 
HuNT, op. cit. supra note 22, at 95. 
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that the promoter file particulars of the name and purpose of the 
company, together with a copy of every prospectus or circular 
addressed to the public.25 There were no provisions specifying the 
required content of the prospectus, nor were there mechanics for 
enforcing liability. The history of English securities regulation 
may be summarized as repeated attempts to increase the effective-
ness of the required disclosure. Content of the prospectus was 
specified in detail;26 requirements of distributing and filing a 
prospectus were increased;27 civil liability of parties preparing 
the prospectus was tightened;28 and a distinction was made between 
private and public companies, with disclosure requirements ap-
plying only to the latter.29 
Only in the past thirty years has there been reasonably 
effective protection of investors in England concerning new issue 
distribution. This protection, however, has not been due to a sole 
reliance on disclosure, but is a result of the development of un-
official regulatory devices, primarily by the London Stock 
Exchange. 80 The action by the London Exchange has been suc-
cessful because there is virtually no over-the-counter market in 
England. This means that a company wishing to sell its securities 
to the public must acquire a listing on an exchange. Before the 
London Exchange grants a listing, approval must be obtained 
from the New Issue Committee. While specific standards are not 
articulated, the Committee apparently often denies listing even 
if complete disclosure is present. In this manner undesirable 
25 Companies Act, 1845, 8 &: 9 Viet., c. 16, § 4. 
26 Certain items were required in the Companies Act, 1867, 30 &: 31 Viet., c. 131, 
§§ 30-31, 38. Comprehensive coverage was obtained in the Companies Act, 1900, 63 &: 64 
Viet., c. 48, and changes were made in the subsequent Companies Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, 
c. 50; 1929, 19 &: 20 Geo. 5, c. 23; 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 47. 
27 The Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 69, provided that a statement 
must be filed with the registrar of companies by a public company even if no prospectus 
was used. In the Companies Act, 1929, 19 &: 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 29, offers for sale were 
made subject to prospectus requirements, and undenvriters offering on behalf of a com-
pany had to furnish a prospectus. It was not until the Companies Act, 1948, 11 &: 12 
Geo. 6, c. 38, that restrictions on placing of securities were complete. See COHEN REPORT 
,r 22. 
28 The Companies Act, 1900, 63 &: 64 Viet., c. 48, increased liabilities of directors and 
promoters. This has remained a controversial area. See NAPIER, H1sroRY OF JOINT STOCK 
COMPANIES' LIABILlTY IN A CENTURY OF LAW REFORM 379-411 (1901); COHEN REPORT 
1111 41, 64. Further changes were made in Companies Act, 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, 
§§ 60, 63; Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958, 6 &: 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45, §§ 13, 14. 
29 Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 69. 
80 In 1930 the London Stock Exchange reformed its rules as a result of abuses in the 
preceding years, when securities of new companies that had been distributed through the 
exchange had injured numerous investors. See MAGUIRE, THE STOCK ExcHANGE As A 
NATIONAL lNSIITUTION (1949). 
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stocks are kept from the public.81 In addition to the regulatory 
work of the Exchange, the issuing houses-a relatively small group 
of firms that handle the bulk of the underwriting-have been 
given credit for playing an important, although unofficial, role in 
investor protection. They, too, go beyond a requirement of dis-
closure and refuse to be associated with a poorly planned or 
financed company. While statistical evidence is not available, the 
latest study of securities regulation conducted by the Jenkins 
Committee expressed little concern regarding investor frauds in 
new issue sales.82 
In the United States, the disclosure device for regulation of 
issuers of securities was adopted with relatively little discussion 
as to its merits.83 The objective of the corrective legislation, as 
stated in Democratic Party Platform in 1932, was to protect the 
small investor from fraud in the initial purchase of securities.34 
This purpose was reiterated by President Roosevelt in his address 
to Congress in 1933.35 The specific frame of reference was the 
speculative outburst of the late 1920's and the subsequent market 
crash. 
For several years prior to 1933 many serious writers had been 
Sl "In (the Record's) Department is a dosier of anyone who in the past has 'kicked 
over the traces' in any way. And if that person's name is connected, however remotely, 
with a subsequent subscription of capital, you may be sure that the Stock Exchange 
Council is going to be very wary before it gives permission to deal in that subsequent 
issue." WINCOIT, THE STOCK EXCHANGE 128 (1946). See also The Stock Exchange Com-
mittee and the Investor, 111 The Economist 323 (1930). The role of the exchange was 
recognized in the Cohen Report and the Jenkins Report, and the Companies Act, 1948, 
11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 39(1), gives certain exemptions for companies granted a listing 
in an exchange. 
32 "The new issues market is now virtually monopolised by a small number of firms 
who are experts in this type of transaction and who either devote themselves entirely to 
it or who combine it with merchant banking and acting as company registrars or the like. 
Most of these firms are members of the Issuing Houses Association and their high repute, 
and their determination not to forfeit it, are probably the greatest safeguards which the 
public have. The nature of the role which they play differs somewhat according to the 
method of issue employed, but in most cases they will be associated with it either as 
principals or agents of the company and, if it is unsuccessful, will incur a risk either to 
their pockets or their reputations or both. Hence the close scrutiny which they give to 
issues which they sponsor is a far more effective restraint on fraudulent or uneconomic 
issues than any legal regulations." GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF MonERN COMPANY LAw 
269 (1957). See also JENKINS REPORT 1f11 11, 225, 227. 
83 The best commentaries on the legislative history are MoLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS 
175-84 (1939); James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32 MICH. L. REv. 624 (1934); Landis, 
The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959). 
See also Gadsby, Historical Development of the S.E.C.-The Government View, 28 GEO. 
WMH. L. REV. 6 (1959). 
84 77 CONG. REc. 2923 (1933) (Remarks of Rep. Bulwinkle in reference to the Demo-
cratic national platform and President Roosevelt's message to Congress, cited note 35 
infra). 
85 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933). 
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advocating the need for companies to disclose financial data. For 
most, the objective was not necessarily to protect the small investor 
from fraud, but a desire to assure a free and open securities 
market. For example, in Main Street and Wall Street, William 
Ripley stated: "Must one reiterate that the prevention of fraud, 
while important, is limited to a few companies; while the registra-
tion of a fair market price, consonant with the real earning power 
of the company, is a matter of daily and universal importance to 
every shareholder who may have occasion to buy or to sell 
securities?"36 
This concern over a free market was based on the theory that, 
given adequate information, the laws of supply and demand, com-
bined with action by each purchaser for his own best interest, 
would establish a true market value for the security. For some, 
the need for a "free market" was tied to a recognition of the 
great growth of the largest corporations. In The Modern Corpo-
ration and Private Property, A. A. Berle, Jr., and Gardner Means 
advocated disclosure on the part of companies because investors, 
being separated from direct management and control of the com-
pany, buy and sell securities on the faith of the market appraisal 
of the value of the stock. Disclosure is needed because this cannot 
be a valid appraisal unless there is free and equal information 
about all companies.37 
Brandeis, to whom many give credit for being the strongest 
advocate for full disclosure, also directed his principal fire against 
the big companies. His famous quotation, "sunlight is said to be 
the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient police-
man,"38 was made in relation to the amount of underwriting com-
missions received by J. P. Morgan & Co. for their role in selling 
securities of major companies. 
The arguments for disclosure expressed by these men applied 
equally to the need for continuing disclosure through annual 
reports, as much as to the need for disclosure at the time of initial 
offering. All would probably have argued that disclosure would 
help prevent fraud in the initial sale of securities to small in-
vestors, but this was not necessarily their main objective. 
Individuals such as Douglas, who had their eyes strictly on the 
problem of protecting the small investor from fraudulent schemes, 
36 RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET, 219 (1927). 
37 BERLE &: MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933) (see 
particularly pp. 300-25). 
38 BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (new ed. 1933). 
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doubted that disclosure by companies was sufficient. Douglas ad-
vocated the need to control "unsound securities" and "high 
pressure salesmanship" if the average investor was to be adequately 
protected. 89 
Many states, following the example of Kansas in 1911, had 
enacted Blue Sky Laws which provided regulatory schemes to 
prohibit certain companies from selling securities to the public.40 
In 1933, the first bill submitted to both houses of Congress was 
basically regulatory and provided that permission to sell securities 
could be denied on an administrative finding that "the enterprise 
or business of the issuer ... is not based on sound principles ... " 
or that the issuer "is in any way dishonest" or "in unsound con-
dition or insolvent."41 With comparatively little discussion, the 
present Securities Act was substituted for the bill initially filed. 
The main argument for disclosure was that a regulatory approach 
was not administratively practical.42 Whether the disclosure ap-
proach alone would in fact protect small investors from fraudulent 
schemes or the making of poor investments was generally not 
discussed. 
In brief, the Securities Act prohibits a company from directly 
or indirectly offering to sell securities to the public unless a 
registration statement has been filed with the Commission. Any 
offering in writing is deemed a prospectus and must conform to 
specific requirements. A sale to the public cannot take place until 
the registration has become effective-at least twenty days after 
filing-and a current prospectus must be sent at the time of sale 
if it has not been done previously. The registration statement 
must contain detailed information about the company and the 
distribution, including: a description of the business; its organi-
zation, financial history, and capital structure; names and com-
pensation of officers and directors; description of special interests 
of management; description of property; financial statements; and 
the plan of distribution and intended use of proceeds. The 
30 See Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. (N.S.) 521, 523 (1934). See also 
Douglas &: Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933). For recent 
statements advocating regulation beyond disclosure, see Joslin, Federal Securities Regula-
tion From the Small Investors' Perspective, 6 J. PuB. L. 219 (1957); Wright, Correlation 
of State Blue Sky Laws and the Federal Securities Acts, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 259, 262 (1941). 
40 Kan. Laws 1911, ch. 133, see I Loss, op. cit. supra note 4, at 23-105 for citation and 
general discussion of state Blue Sky Laws. 
41 H.R. 4314 and S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1933). 
42 77 CONG. REc. 2918, 2931, 2947-51 (1933) (discussion of S. 875 and H.R. 4314, 73d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) ). But see H.R. REP. No. 1363, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), which 
stresses tbe value of publicity in bringing about a situation where tbe market price re-
flects as nearly as possible a just price. 
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prospectus must include all data required by the registration, with 
the exception of certain specific items such as exhibits, marketing 
arrangements, and data on subsidiaries. 
The Securities Act included two important extensions beyond 
the English Companies Act designed to offer greater investor 
protection. First, under the Securities Act there is a waiting period 
of at least twenty days between the filing of the registration state-
ment and the time when a sale can be made; under the English 
System the prospectus need not be filed until the time of sale}8 
The second and more important difference is that the Commission 
closely checks the registration statement for misstatements and 
omissions. In England the prospectus is filed with the Board of 
Trade, and little or no checking is done by that organization.44 
Through the informal administrative device of the deficiency 
letter, the Commission insures that the registration statement and 
prospectus clearly state the facts. 
B. Evaluation of the Issuance Requirements 
Certainly the disclosures required by Securities Act have made 
the markets more free, as well as better evaluators of the worth 
of securities. The legal requirement of disclosure removed any 
competitive disadvantage incurred by those who had volunteered 
full information. The high quality of administrative checking 
has permitted investors to rely on the published prospectus. It 
can be safely stated that the Securities Act has prevented numerous 
investors from buying poor quality stocks. Further, knowledge of 
the detailed scrutiny of registration statements by the Commis-
sion has had a prophylactic effect in discouraging shady promoters 
from attempting to go to the public for capital. The Securities Act 
appears to have acted well in times of normal market behavior. 
In times of speculative hysteria, however, the disclosure require-
ments of the Securities Act, even with the verification of material 
by the Commission, have not been sufficient to prevent serious 
investor loss. 
The Special Study Report dealt with the distribution of 
securities only to a limited extent, but some material is presented 
on new issue behavior during the period 1952 to 1962.45 A survey 
48 CoHEN REPORT ,r 27 (1945). In 1948 The Companies Act, 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, 
c. 38, § 50(5), provided that a period of at least three days must elapse between issuance 
of the prospectus and the opening of the subscription list. 
44 JENKINS REPORT 1J 227. 
45 Of the thirteen chapters of the Report of the Special Study, only chapter IV-A 
dealt with distribution problems. Even here, the emphasis was on the role of the under-
writer and not on the issuer. 
1964] DISCLOSURE 617 
was made of all companies which sold securities through a public 
offering for the first time during this period-an estimated 2,880 
corporations.46 The companies were divided into two categories: 
"promotional"-those formed within one year of going public or 
those with no net income for at least one of two preceding fiscal 
years; and "operational"-all others. The survey revealed that 
by the fall of 1962 a total of thirty-seven percent of the companies 
which had sold securities to the public between 1952 and 1962 
could not be located or were known to be liquidated, inactive, or 
in receivership, and only thirty-four percent showed a net profit 
on their last balance sheet. For the promotional companies, a total 
of fifty-five percent were apparently out of business, and only 
fourteen percent showed a net profit on the last balance sheet. 
It is estimated that 1,050 companies making their first public 
offering between 1952 and 1962 had failed by 1962, after having 
raised over one hundred million dollars from investors. 
While there is need for an avenue for companies to be able 
to raise risk capital, it appears obvious that many of these com-
panies, particularly those with no operational history, went public 
only to benefit the promoters, insiders, and underwriters. Thus, 
one part of the current problem involving new issues is that 
numerous untried promotional companies which soon fail are 
able to sell their securities in spite of the initial disclosure re-
quirements. Another aspect is the "hot issue" phenomena.47 The 
"hot issue" as described by the Special Study is a security of a 
new company which is sold at a premium over its offering price 
immediately after the initial distribution. In many instances the 
supply of such a security is artificially controlled by underwriters, 
and active efforts are made to stimulate demand. In most instances, 
the market price of the "hot issues" fell below the offering price 
several months following the offering.48 
High pressure selling is one of the most important factors 
involved in the sale of unsound securities and the unrealistic 
prices accompanying the sale of "hot issues." Improper selling 
practices constitute a large subject, involving qualifications and 
supervision of salesmen, in addition to direct regulatory control.49 
Here, it is only necessary to point out that, even though a com-
46 spedal Study pt. I, at 491 n.29, 550-53. 
47 See Special Study pt. 1, at 516-47. 
48 The unseasoned issues had a greater price fluctuation than the seasoned issues. Of 
the unseasoned issues offered in 1961, 85% sold at premiums immediately after issue, and 
by September 1962, 77% of them sold below the offering price. Id. at 516-17. 
40 See Comment, 62 MICH. L. REv. 680, 730 (1964). 
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pany makes adequate disclosure, the investor comes in contact 
only with the salesman, not with the company. Active touting by 
an aggressive salesman is far more likely to sell securities than the 
prospectus, with its often lengthy, dull, and complex presentation. 
The combination of the speculative fervor of investors with 
the attitudes of some promoters, underwriters, and security sales-
men created a situation beyond the control of the Commission 
and the Securities Act. In part, there was a breakdown of dis-
closure mechanisms. The waiting period designed to provide 
time for investor study of the issue failed in its objective. Indi-
cations of interest were obtained by telephone, and in many in-
stances no preliminary prospectus was sent.50 The investor's first 
real information about the company came with the final 
prospectus mailed with his confirmation of purchase. Investors 
buying in the market immediately following the distributions 
were generally not furnished any prospectus at all. 51 As these new 
issues were not listed on an exchange, there was no requirement 
for continuous reports, and the investor often could not obtain 
current information about his company.52 The great increase in 
the number of new issues and the limited staff of the Commission 
meant that detailed checking of registration statements and 
prospectus was curtailed.53 Also, even when an investor was pre-
sented with an accurate prospectus prior to his purchase, the 
50 Unless the offer is in writing, no prospectus need be sent. Securities Act § 5, 48 
Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958). See Special Study pt. 1, at 547-50. See also id. pt. 1, 
at 265-68 on the problem of the boiler rooms. 
51 There is no requirement to send a prospectus when the sales are unsolicited, or 
when the sale is solicited forty days after the date upon which the security was bona 
fide offered to the public. Securities Act § 4, 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1958). 
Furthermore, many broker-dealers failed to send a prospectus even for a solicited offer 
within the forty-day period. Special Study pt. 1, at 547-50. 
52 See Part Ill infra. A senior partner of one of the largest brokerage houses in the 
country has said: "In fact, it would be my judgment that newly organized, promotional 
enterprises with little or no record of business performance, whether they be regulation 
A or otherwise, should be required to make monthly progress reports to their stock-
holders to keep them informed as to how their money is being used-just as it would 
be in the case of a partnership. Such monthly reporting should be required until they 
have reached a stage where their size and maturity and everything about them were 
such that they would be qualified for listing if they so desired. At that point the require-
ments could be relaxed to the standards of listed companies." Quoted in Special Study 
pt. 3, at 9-10. 
53 During fiscal 1961, 1,830 registration statements were filed, of which 958, or 52%, 
were filed by companies that had not previously filed registration statements under the 
Securities Act of 1933. 27 SEC ANN. REP. 29 (1961). During the fiscal 1950, 496 registration 
statements were filed, of which 112, or 23%, were first filings. 16 SEC ANN. REP. 8 (1950). 
On the other hand, there were a total of 998 Commission personnel in fiscal 1950, id. at 
167, while in fiscal 1961 the total number of personnel had increased to 1,087. 27 SEC 
ANN. REP. 197 (1961). Thus while Commission personnel increased about 10%, first filings 
increased about 850%. 
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presentation in most instances tended to discourage reading by 
all but the most knowledgeable and tenacious. Recommenda-
tions of the Special Study were aimed at correcting some of these 
gaps. Legislation proposed by the Commission would extend the 
time during which a prospectus must be sent to purchasers.54 It 
has also been suggested by numerous sources that the objective of 
disclosure can be improved by demanding a better written and 
clearer prospectus.55 A short form of summary to point out the 
hazards of investing in a non-operating promotional company, 
with a clear statement of underwriting costs, equity dilution, and 
the cost of promoters' shares could be of help.56 The Commission 
has taken steps in this direction, but more could still be done. 
Even with the disclosure mechanisms working perfectly, would 
they prevent abuses and investor losses in a period like that of 1959 
to 1962? As mentioned above, the English experience has been 
that something more than disclosure is needed. For the English, 
an apparently workable solution is provided by the unofficial regu-
lation by the London Exchange and the underwriters themselves. 
In this country the solution is not so easy. New issues are dis-
tributed and traded through the over-the-counter market. The 
exchanges have a minor role in distributions, and the under-
writing community is not currently designed to play a regulatory 
role. Many of the larger underwriters have in fact worked hard 
to protect their reputations, and apparently have not become 
associated with a stock offering unless they believed the company 
had a good chance of success, and that full and continuing dis-
closure would be made to investors. 57 These same underwriters 
attempted to avoid an artificial run-up in price of their newly 
54 On July 30, 1963, the Senate passed S. 1642 (The Securities Acts Amendments of 
1963), in which the forty-day period during which all dealers are required to deliver pros-
pectus was extended to ninety days in the case of first issues. 1963 U.S. Code Cong. &: 
Admin. News, No. 9, p. xxi (Aug. 20, 1963). The Special Study also recommended that the 
Commission make acceleration of the effective date conditional on delivery of the pros-
pectus at least two days before the sale. Special Study pt. I, at 558. 
55 See l Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 261-65 (2d ed. 1961), dealing with the problem 
of the unreadable prospectus; Special Study pt. 1, at 552. 
56 "\Ve have a concrete suggestion on this point. It is that each prospectus be accom-
panied by a one-page summary of the more important facts about the issue, in a form 
approved by the SEC. The summary should contain at least a brief reference, citing page 
numbers, to every unfavorable factor described in the prospectus itself and deemed to be 
of more than incidental importance. Such a one-page summary could tell the investor 
pretty well what he is getting for his money." GRAHAM, DODD 8: CoTILE, SECURITY 
ANALYSIS 677 (4th ed. 1962). 
57 "Most of the older firms exercised careful investment banking judgment in deter-
mining which companies were suitable for public ownership, and in so doing still pro-
vided many small companies with access to the capital markets." Special Study pt. 1, 
at 553. 
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issued securities. It was easy, however, to be an underwriter 
during 1959-62; and a company turned down by one broker-
dealer could find someone else who was not as particular.58 
Recommendations of the Special Study regarding require-
ments of higher qualifications for underwriters and salesmen and 
the developing of self-regulatory bodies are commendable. It 
should be recognized, however, that serious problems remain. 
Disclosure, as called for in the Securities Act and enforced ad-
ministratively by the Commission, has done much to assure that, 
at least in normal times, the market can fairly appraise new 
securities, and that investors will be reasonably protected. In times 
of speculative outbursts, disclosure alone is not, and probably 
cannot be, adequate protection for investors. In the absence of 
effective federal protection, there is pressure for the states to take 
a more active role.59 This leads only to confusion and unfairness. 
The record of promotional companies is such that some federal 
action to limit their access to the public market seems desirable. 
The Commission should attempt to determine various specific 
factors of success or failure and make proposals as to the additional 
powers needed. 
Ill. OBLIGATION OF THE ISSUER To MAKE CONTINUOUS 
DISCLOSURE THROUGH PERIODIC REPORTS 
That a corporation selling stock to a purchaser should disclose 
financial information concerning the company is merely an ex-
tension of the normal seller's obligation based on the nature of 
the commodity. A more difficult problem has been to justify the 
need for a corporation to continue to make disclosures. Specifi-
cally, the question is the extent of the company's obligation to 
individuals who purchase from existing shareholders. It is argued 
that once a distribution is completed, a company has no interest 
58 "To a large extent, broker-dealers who managed the underwriting of unseasoned 
issues of common stock in 1961 were relative newcomers to the field. . • . More than half 
(271) of these underwriters had been organized less than 6 years before the offering, while 
over one-fourth (146) were formed either in the year preceding or the year in which the 
offering was made." Special Study pt. 1, at 493-94. As an indication of a tougher attitude 
toward underwriters, see In the Matter of The Richmond Corp., SEC Securities Act 
Release No. 4584, Feb. 27, 1963. In this release, the Commission issued a stop order sus-
pending the effectiveness of a registration statement. Among the grounds stated were 
(1) failure of the registration statement to disclose the limited experience of the under• 
writer and (2) lack of an independent investigation of the underwriter by the issuer. 
59 For example, note the active role of the state of California in developing a strict 
regulatory program. See SCHLEI, STATE REGULATION OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL PRAcnCES: 
THE CALIFORNIA ExPERIENCE (1961); Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the 
California Corporate Securities Act, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 343 (1945). 
1964] DISCLOSURE 621 
in later trading in its securities. The transaction is between two 
private parties, and the company plays no role. That this argument 
has been effective is demonstrated by the different obligations of 
the issuer depending on whether the sale is by the issuer or is 
between two parties having no relation to the issuer. During a 
distribution and for forty days thereafter, the issuer has a positive 
duty to furnish a prospectus to any purchaser.00 A purchaser who 
buys the company's stock after the forty-day period, or from a 
source other than the company, need not be furnished with any-
thing. The anomaly becomes most acute when a company which 
has shares currently outstanding makes a new offering of identical 
shares. A purchaser who buys shares of the new offering must be 
furnished a prospectus; a purchaser buying shares the same day, 
but purchasing from another shareholder in the over-the-counter 
market or on an exchange, need not be furnished with any infor-
mation.61 There are, however, a variety of requirements which 
insure that current financial data of many companies is available 
to the investor who has the initiative to seek it out. However, these 
requirements do not apply to all companies, and the most pressing 
problem in this area is the need to expand the coverage. 
There is also need to recognize the overlapping function of 
continuous reporting requirements and the registration and 
prospectus requirements applicable when a new distribution is 
made. The investor would be better protected and companies 
would avoid unnecessary burdens if a closer integration of the re-
quirements could be achieved. A corollary to this integration 
would be increased availability of the periodic financial reports, 
and the obtaining of better and more standardized reports from 
the companies. 
A. Background and Current Practices 
The requirement that companies disclose financial data on 
a continuing basis has taken two approaches. The first and oldest 
was initiated by the exchanges. If a company wants to be listed on 
an exchange it must agree to submit periodic reports. Becoming 
listed on an exchange came to be a voluntary act by the company, 
and reporting was one of the commitments made by the company 
in the listing agreement with the exchange. The London Ex-
oo Securities Act § 4(1), 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1958). 
01 Under Securities Act Rule 153, if the securities are listed, delivery of the prospectus 
is accompanied by delivery to the exchange; there is no requirement that a purchaser 
actually receive a prospectus. 17 C.F.R. § 230.153 (1949). 
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change required such disclosure before any periodic reports were 
demanded in the Companies Act,62 and the New York Stock 
Exchange had required annual reports of listed companies for 
several years before enactment of the Exchange Act.63 The Ex-
change Act codified this approach, applying it to all registered 
exchanges and requiring that reports be filed with the Commis-
sion as well as the Exchange.64 Nothing need be given to 
purchasers, but current information about the company is on 
file. Currently, all companies listed on a national exchange are 
required to file the following reports: 65 
(1) Annual Reports (Form 10-K), which must include: 
(a) A balance sheet and profit and loss statement pre-
pared according to the Commission's accounting reg-
ulations and certified by an independent public ac-
countant; 
(b) Disclosure of any interest of an officer or director in 
a material transaction of the corporation; and 
(c) Various data on principal shareholders, officers and 
directors, including their remuneration, amounts ac-
crued in retirement plans, and exercise of stock op-
tions. 
(2) Semi-Annual Reports (Form 9-K), which include an un-
certified profit and loss statement. 
(3) Current Reports (Form 8-K), which must be filed on the 
occurrence of any event of immediate interest to share-
holders, such as 
(a) Change in control; 
(b) Acquisition or sale of a significant amount of assets; 
(c) Involvement in important legal proceedings; and 
(d) Any matter which requires a vote of shareholders. 
The second approach toward the obtaining of continuous fi-
nancial data is to require that information be sent to existing share-
62 In 1881 the London Stock Exchange began to require annual reports. See Ducum, 
THE STORY OF THE STOCK EXCHANGE: !TS HISTORY AND POSITION 355 (1901). 
63 Beginning in 1920 the New York Stock Exhange required comprehensive 
financial reports prior to listing. See RIPLEY, op. cit. supra note 36, at 210. 
64 Exchange Act §§ 12, 13, 48 Stat. 892, 894 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78m (1958). 
65 Form 10-K, adopted in SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4991, Jan. 28, 
1954, is to be used for annual reports pursuant to §§ 13 or 15d of the Exchange Act, for 
which no other form is prescribed. Form 9-K, adopted in SEC Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 5189, June 23, 1955, is to be used for the semi-annual reports required by 
Rules 13a-13 and 15d-13 of the General Rules and Regulations under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-13, 240.15d-13 (1949). Form 8-K, adopted in 
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4991, Jan. 28, 1954, is to be used for current 
reports under §§ 13 or 15d of the Exchange Act, filed pursuant to Rule X-13A-ll or 
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holders. The Exchange Act requires that any proxy solicited by a 
company listed on an exchange conform to the rules of the Com-
mission. 66 Through its rule-making power, the Commission has 
enacted comprehensive requirements governing what must be 
disclosed when proxies are solicited for votes on various corporate 
matters. For example, the proxy statement sent prior to annual 
meetings for election of directors must contain the name of each 
nominee and his principal occupation, amount of equity share-
holdings in the company, remuneration (if over 30,000 dollars), 
retirement benefits, stock options, and any interest in material 
transactions with the company. In addition, an annual report must 
be sent containing financial statements which adequately reflect 
the financial position and operation of the company. 67 
If a company can obtain a quorum without soliciting proxies, 
there is no requirement under the Exchange Act that the share-
holders be sent anything. However, the New York Stock Exchange 
requires all listed companies to solicit proxies.68 The proxy ma-
chinery is a most effective disclosure device, and for companies 
listed on the NYSE there is, in fact, a wealth of information avail-
able. As will be discussed later, the main problem with regard to 
listed companies is not the obtaining of information; it is the 
presentation of such information in a clear and standardized man-
ner, readily accessible to investors. 
B. Evaluation of the Continuing Disclosure Requirements 
I. Extension of Required Reporting 
A third approach to continuous reporting is desperately needed 
in order to provide data on companies which are not listed on an 
Rule X-15D-ll. There are other forms, such as Form 7-K, adopted in SEC Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 6820, June 12, 1962 (for quarterly reports of certain real 
estate companies), which deal with particular kinds of companies. 
66 Exchange Act § 14, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1958). 
67 SEC Reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (Cum. Supp. 1963). Note that the minimum in-
formation specified depends on the subject matter of the election, e.g., the selection of 
auditors; the approval of bonus and profit-sharing plans; approval of pension and retire-
ment plans; modification or exchange of securities; mergers, consolidations, and acquisi-
tions. The Commission recently took a long overdue step in proposing an amendment to 
its proxy rules requiring that financial statements in annual reports sent to stockholders 
"be consistent in all material respects" with reports filed with the Commission. The Wall 
St. J., Nov. 19, 1963, p. 8, cols. 2-3. 
68 New York Stock Exchange Rule 499, dealing with suspension from dealings or 
removal from the list, indicates that the Exchange "would normally give consideration 
to suspending or removing from the list a security of a company when ••• proxies are 
not solicited for all meetings of stockholders." The American Stock Exchange is reported 
to be embarking on a program to achieve the same results. See S. REP. No. 379, 88th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1963). 
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exchange. This approach is simply to place an obligation to dis-
close, to both potential investors and existing shareholders, on all 
companies which have securities in the hands of the public. This 
obligation should be present regardless of any voluntary act on the 
part of the company to become listed on an exchange. It would 
apply even if the company has never had a public offering under 
the Securities Act.69 As recommended by the Special Study and 
in proposed legislation proposed by the Commission, it would take 
the form of extending the reporting requirements of section 13 
and the proxy restrictions of section 14, of the Exchange Act to 
securities traded in the over-the-counter market.70 
The justification for bringing these companies under federal 
regulation is that it is in the public interest. At the time the Ex-
change Act was passed, the bulk of securities in which there was 
active trading were listed on at least one of the numerous ex-
changes. It was not until the 1920's that common stock was used 
to any extent in this country as the sole means of financing ventures 
other than oil, mining, and other speculative issues, and the distri-
bution and later trading were generally done through the facilities 
of an exchange. It is reported that, at various times, over I 00 
exchanges have existed in the United States-and over 35 during 
the late 1920's.71 An over-the-counter market did exist, but little 
was known of its scope or operation.72 Since the 1930's the over-
the-counter market has had tremendous growth. This is due in 
part to improved communications (the development of the open-
end teletype in 1932-33 was a major factor) which made a central 
location less important; and it appears that the securities acts them-
selves aided the growth. After the Securities Act, new issues were 
not distributed through exchanges, and at least their initial trading 
had to be in the over-the-counter market. Since the Exchange 
Act, many companies have refrained from listing, and others, such 
as banks, have delisted in order to avoid the required disclosures.78 
69 The Exchange Act § 15, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1958), 
provides that any company registering under the Securities Act and having a value of 
over $2,000,000 (aggregate offering price plus the value of other securities of the same 
class) must file periodic reports as required under § 13. 
70 Special Study pt. 3, at 62; see S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). 
71 For early history of securities trading in the United States, see MARTIN, A CENTURY 
OF FINANCE (1898); MEDHENRY, MEN AND MYSTERIES OF WALL STREET (1870); COLE, EARLY 
EXCHANGES (1943) (unpublished monograph in Securities and Exchange Commission 
Library). 
72 An over-the-counter market existed prior to the organization of the exchanges. 
The draftsmen of the Securities Act specifically left the question of the over-the-counter 
market open until further study. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). 
73 At the present time only five banks are listed on national exchanges. Special 
Study pt. 3, at 36. 
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There are virtually no requirements that a company not listed 
on an exchange send even an annual report to its stock.holders. A 
recent check of the corporation laws of all fifty states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia reveals that twenty-two states have corporate 
reporting requirements of one type or another. Of these, in only 
fourteen states are the reports available to shareholders, and in 
three the requirement may be dispensed with by including a con-
trary stipulation in the by-laws. Specific requirements of content 
for reports are generally nonexistent, and only two states require 
certification by a public accountant.74 In no state is there any re-
quirement dealing with proxy solicitation or allowing a state 
agency to exercise control over the form or content of proxy ma-
terial. 
All of the arguments for disclosure raised at the time the secu-
rities acts were enacted apply equally well to securities traded over-
the-counter. If these protections are needed for investors of listed 
stocks, they are certainly necessary for holders of over-the-counter 
stocks. Evidence compiled by the Special Study shows unquestion-
ably that voluntary reporting and the quality of proxies issued by 
over-the-counter companies are inadequate.75 Investor fraud ap-
pears more prevalent with regard to unlisted securities, 76 and 
unquestionably a more free and open market is needed for these 
securities. The double standard should be eliminated, and com-
panies should decide whether they should be listed on an exchange 
by reference to market considerations rather than a desire to avoid 
required filing of reports. On the positive side, the addition of 
a disclosure requirement to the over-the-counter market should 
increase investor confidence, which could lead to increased trading 
volume, better markets, and reduced selling costs. 
It has been reported that there are about 580,000 corporations 
in the United States.77 Conceivably, all of these could have secu-
74 In Massachusetts, certification is needed for a corporation with over $100,000 in 
stock. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156, § 49 (1959). Certification is also required in Pennsyl-
vania, but a corporate by-law may dispense with the requirement. PA. STAT, ANN. tit. 15, 
§ 2852-318 (1958). Almost all states require financial data with tax reports, but these are 
uniformly considered confidential. 
75 Over 25% of the companies sampled by the Special Study did not send any informa-
tion at all to shareholders. Major difficulties were found in many instances. Spedal Study 
pt. 3, at 10-14. 
76 Ninety-three percent of companies involved in fraud actions under the Securities 
Act or the Exchange Act between January 1961 and June 1962 were unlisted companies 
not required to file periodic reports. Id. at IO. 
77 This is the number filing Federal Income Tax returns. It is estimated that about 
50,000 have at least occasional over-the-counter trading. FRIEND, HOFFMAN 8: WINN, THE 
OVER·THE·COUNTER SECURITIES MARKET 5, 46 (1958). 
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rities which are traded at least occasionally. In England, a dis-
tinction is drawn between the private and public company, with 
a private company of under fifty shareholders not subject to dis-
closure requirements.78 The recommendations of the Special Study 
called for all companies with more than 300 shareholders to be 
brought under the disclosure provisions of the Exchange Act.70 
The current legislative proposal of the Commission would include 
all corporations with 500 shareholders and one million dollars in 
assets.80 
While it can be argued that it is in the public interest to protect 
even one shareholder, it would seem that the greatest need for in-
vestor protection exists when the company has shareholders who 
are, in fact, involved in trading activity. It is when a security is 
in the over-the-counter market, in the sense that broker-dealers are 
quoting a market and trading takes place, that the federal govern-
ment has an interest. From statistics gathered by the Special Study 
it appears that, based on the number of dealers quoting a security 
and the amount of trading as indicated by the shares transferred, 
companies with 200 or more shareholders should probably be in-
cluded under the disclosure requirements. An asset test does not 
seem to have any bearing on the public interest. The survey con-
ducted by the Special Study indicated that twenty-two percent of 
the companies reporting less than one million dollars in assets had 
300 shareholders or more, and about eleven percent had 1,000 
shareholders or more.81 For example, many research and electronic 
companies have high sales, but operate with leased buildings and 
equipment and thus report low assets. Also, many of the new promo-
tional companies coming to the market for the first time have low 
assets, and their sorry record demonstrates the need for continuous 
reporting to help protect investors. 
The higher requirement of number of shareholders and the 
asset test in the proposed legislation are intentionally designed to 
reduce the number of companies subject to the disclosure require-
ments. 82 This reflects a concern over the administrative burden 
thrown on the Commission in checking these reports. The pro-
posed legislation is unduly cautious, and the coverage should be 
78 Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38. 
79 special Study pt. 3, at 62. 
so S. 1642, passed by the Senate on July 30, 1963, 109 CoNG. R.Ec. 12962 ijuly 30, 1963). 
81 Tables showing the interrelationship of shares transferred, number of broker-
dealers quoting the security, number of shareholders, and asset size are found in the text 
and appendix to the Special Study pt. 3, ch. IX. 
82 See S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, 21, 27 (1963). 
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expanded. Two somewhat contradictory suggestions are made in 
answer to the argument that the Commission is not capable of 
policing the increased number of firms. First, it is urged that the 
Commission should attempt to make better use of automation to 
check filed reports. The use of existing data processing equipment 
could greatly improve and simplify the checking process. Instead 
of storing the reservoir of material about a company in a file 
drawer at the Commission, it could be placed on computer tape. 
Periodic reports and proxy materials could be filed in a form to 
be directly programmed into the computer and automatically 
cross-checked for various items. Independent analysis would prob-
ably still be needed, but it could be kept to a minimum. The 
second suggestion is to rely to a greater extent on private actions 
to insure that companies report accurately. As was noted, the 
Board of Trade in England-the closest equivalent to the SEC-
does almost no checking of prospectuses or annual reports, but 
relies on private remedies as the principal enforcement tool. 
The existing specific civil remedies provided by the Exchange 
Act for false or misleading statements in reports filed with the Com-
mission offer little, if any, advantage over actions for common-law 
fraud. Aside from showing the presence of a false or misleading 
statement in a report, a plaintiff must also prove (a) that the price 
of the security purchased or sold "was affected" by the statement 
and (b) that he purchased or sold the security in reliance upon the 
statement. In addition, a defendant may absolve himself from 
liability by proving "that he acted in good faith and had no 
knowledge that such statement was false or misleading."88 Proving 
that price action was affected by any single factor84 is an almost 
impossible task with actively traded securities. When this burden 
is coupled with the good faith defense, it is not surprising that no 
case has been located in which a plaintiff was successful in recov-
ering for a false or misleading statement in a filed report. 
As a minimum, the liability for false or misleading statements 
in periodic reports should correspond to the current provisions 
with respect to false or misleading statements in a prospectus or 
registration statement. For actions under the Securities Act, the 
83 Exchange Act § 18, 48 Stat. 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1958). 
84 Similar language is contained in § 9 of the Exchange Act. As an example of the 
difficulty in proving the causes of price fluctuations, it is worthy of note that the Special 
Study, after extensive study of the market as a whole and of individual securities, con-
cluded, in reference to the price drop of May 1962, that "neither this study nor that of 
the New York Stock Exchange was able to isolate and identify the 'causes' of the market 
events of May 28, 29 and 31." Special Study pt. 4, at 859. 
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burden of showing the effect of the false or misleading statement 
is reversed, as the innocent purchaser is entitled to damages unless 
the defendant can prove that the depreciation in value resulted 
from some cause other than the defect in the registration state-
ment. 85 A defendant other than the issuer may avoid liability if 
he had a reasonable ground for belief and actually did believe in 
the truth and accuracy of the statement contained in the regis-
tration statement. Perhaps something similar to this is needed to 
protect a company from accidental reporting mistakes, but the 
burden should be on the company to prove it had a reasonable 
basis for its belief in the truth of the statement.86 The civil lia-
bility provisions of the Securities Act have not resulted in a crush-
ing burden on companies.87 Holding companies to stricter civil 
liabilities concerning their periodic reports would not be too 
onerous, and would relieve some of the administrative load of 
the Commission. There is a great need for companies with ac-
tively-traded securities to make periodic reports, and the excuse 
of administrative burden is not a sound reason for the delay in 
obtaining as complete coverage as possible. 
2. Integration of Periodic Reports With 
Registration Requirements 
Better methods of checking filed reports and tougher civil 
liability provisions are actually separate issues from that of in-
creasing the number of companies required to report. It is gen-
erally acknowledged that the current work load of the Commission 
prevents the careful checking of all filed reports. Increasing this 
work load by doubling the number of reporting companies88 would 
85 Securities Act § ll(e), 48 Stat. 83 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958), pro-
vides: "If the defendant proves that any portion or all of such damages represents other 
than the depreciation in value of such security resulting from such part of the registra• 
tion statement, with respect to which his liability is asserted, not being true or omitting 
to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements 
therein not misleading, such portion of or all such damages shall not be recoverable." 
. 86 Securities Act § llb, 48 Stat. 82 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958). The burden here is 
on the defendant to show reasonable investigation and reasonable ground for belief that 
the statements were correct and true. This is far different from § 18 of the Exchange Act, 
which provides that the defendant need only prove that he had no knowledge that the 
statements were false. 
87 In fact, only two reported cases were found which involved recovery under § 11 of 
the Securities Act. A partial explanation is that the administrative checking eliminates 
most misleading and erroneous statements. In addition, there undoubtedy have been 
recoveries based on § 11 which were not reported or litigated. See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra 
note 55, at 1721-42, 1747-54; Hayes, Tort Liability for Misstatements or Omissions in Sales 
of Securities, 12 CLEV.•MAR. L. REv. 100 (1963); Simpson, Investors' Civil Remedies Under 
the Federal Securities Laws, 12 DEPAUL L. REv. 71 (1962). 
88 During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1962, there were 4,122 annual and other 
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merely magnify the problem. The Commission directs its primary 
attention to the investigation of registration statements for new 
issues. This is necessary and proper with regard to companies 
going public for the first time. For companies with securities 
already outstanding, this concentration on new registrations rather 
than the periodic reports is unwarranted. The periodic reports 
provide a reservoir of data about a company that includes most of 
the information that is found in a registration statement. If the 
periodic reports were prepared and reviewed with the care pres-
ently given registration statements, and if there were stronger 
sanctions for false or misleading statements, there would be little 
need for a full registration for each new issue. 89 
A closer integration of the disclosure required by the Securities 
Act with that required by the Exchange Act could greatly reduce 
the burden on companies subject to these acts, and at the same 
time better perform the basic function of disclosure. The Special 
Study recommended that the Commission develop such a program 
of integration.00 This is a particularly important recommendation 
when it is coupled with the proposal that broker-dealers be obli-
gated to make wider use of the filed material. The Special Study 
suggested that this obligation of the broker-dealer might include 
"actually consulting available officially filed data prior to recom-
mending or selling specific securities; furnishing copies to cus-
tomers in appropriate cases .... "91 These recommendations 
move in the direction of reducing or removing the registration and 
prospectus requirement for established companies, and substi-
periodic reports filed by issuers under the Exchange Act of 1934. 18 SEC ANN. REP. 43 
(1962). Adding to the burden of the Commission were 458 reports of issuers filed under 
§ 30 of the Investment Company Act. Ibid. The Special Study estimated that a standard 
of 200 shareholders or more would subject 6,373 new companies to the requirements of 
the Exchange Act; a standard of 300 or more would add 5,472; a standard of 500 or more 
would add 3,973; and a standard of 750 or more would add 2,860. Special Study pt. 3, 
Table IX-F. 
80 Certain economies are already present in the two acts. Rule 12b-35 of the Ex-
change Act provides for a simplified method of registration if a Securities Act registration 
(Form S-1) is on file. 17 C.F.R. § 240.126-35 (1949). Rule 13a(3) permits a company to file 
a copy of a Securities Act registration in place of its annual report (Form 10-K); and 
Rule 13a(4) allows a company to incorporate by reference in its annual report copies of 
prospectuses filed in accordance with Rule 424 of the Securities Act. Furthermore, the 
Securities Act permits certain omissions of data required in Form S-1 if equivalent in-
formation is on file pursuant to the Securities Act or the Exchange Act. There have been 
proposals for closer integration of these two acts discussed by Congress. See Hearings on 
S. 2816 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 83d 
Cong,, 2d Sess. 285 (1954). The Commission endorsed the proposal for high-grade bonds 
but not for securities. Id. at 3-5. 
oo Special Study pt. 1, at 594-95. 
01 Id. at 329. 
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tuting for these requirements obligations of stricter periodic re-
porting by the companies, as well as disclosure by broker-dealers 
in all sales-not just the sale of new issues. This approach stresses 
the importance of disclosure in the trading of securities and con-
forms with the important objective of providing a free market 
to act as an evaluator of the value of each security. Only the com-
pany selling securities to the public for the first time should be 
required to go through a full registration process. Commission 
investigation of these companies can become even more detailed. 
Established companies should be able to file a short form registra-
tion containing only data pertinent to the new issue. If a company 
desires to use a prospectus as a selling tool, this document should 
conform to minimum requirements; even here, however, a shorter, 
more flexible form of prospectus would be possible. 
3. Standardized Reporting of Financial Data 
The heart of the disclosure required of issuers is the reporting 
of financial data-the balance sheet and profit-and-loss statement. 
The Commission has promulgated accounting regulations which 
specify the general manner of reporting financial data for all ma-
terial filed by a company under the securities acts.92 In most in-
stances, financial reports must be certified by an independent 
public accountant. In spite of the regulations and required cer-
tification, the vast difference in accounting methods often prevents 
a meaningful comparison between companies. Two companies 
may in fact have identical operating histories, yet one can present 
an annual profit-and-loss statement showing a profit, and the other 
a loss. For example, it has been stated that oil companies can in 
effect report whatever earnings they desire. Some companies can 
write off intangible drilling costs in the year in which they are 
incurred, while others capitalize such expenditures and depreciate 
them over the expected life of the well. In addition, there is no 
consistency in the grouping of items such as depreciation, deple-
tion, leases, dry-hole costs, etc.93 The skilled financial analyst, by 
dint of hard work, visits to the company, and tracing of historical 
data, is usually able to make an adequate judgment, but for the 
92 Regulation S-X governs the form and content for reports required under the 
Securities Act, Exchange Act, Investment Company Act, and Holding Company Act. See 
generally RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1963) pp. 3-1, 
3-2. Under the Holding Company Act the Commission has gone further and in Rules 26 
and 93 required uniform accounts. 
93 See Crane, A Security Analyst Looks at Annual Reports, 105 J. AccouNTANCY, 
March 1958, p. 31; Wise, The Auditors Have Arrived, Fortune, Dec. 1960, p. 144. 
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investor who relies only on financial reports comparisons between 
companies are often impossible. 
Lack of standardized accounting procedures reduces the value 
of disclosure in all instances, but the problem is particularly acute 
with regard to the periodic reports required by the Exchange Act. 
These reports provide the basis for comparison of the merits of 
particular companies, which evaluation in tum determines the 
market price of the securities. Standardization and uniformity of 
reporting is not an easy goal. Accounting problems can be ex-
tremely complex, and the subject is mentioned only because of 
its importance in any evaluation of disclosure. Inherent are prob-
lems of valuation as well as the mechanics of reporting. It is re-
ported that the proponents of uniformity, even among the certified 
public accountants themselves, are in a distinct minority.94 The 
Commission's regulations specify only broad outlines, and the 
Commission accepts methods determined according to generally 
accepted accounting practices.95 The accountants argue that the 
proper accounting system must be designed to fit the needs of the 
particular company, and that there is no "right" way. Even if 
this argument is sound, it does not answer the question of why 
financial data, when reported to the Commission and investors, 
cannot be converted to a uniform format. While it may be true 
that the Commission has accomplished some progress in improving 
accounting standards, it has been hesitant in the past to take bold 
steps toward requiring uniformity. If the accountants do not make 
faster progress, the Commission must be increasingly more active. 
One of the main functions of disclosure by companies is to permit 
the market place to make an evaluation of the worth of securities. 
Without uniformity of reporting practices this function cannot 
be properly fulfilled. 
JV. DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS 
IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS 
The usual concept of the role of disclosure in securities regu-
lation includes only the obligation of the issuer of securities-
duties relating to the registration statement, the prospectus, and 
04 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has a committee working 
on the problems of uniformity, but it has had little reported success thus far. See Wise, 
supra note 93. 
95 "Financial statements may be filed in such form and order, and may use such 
generally accepted terminology, as will best indicate their significance and character in 
the light of the provisions applicable thereto." SEC Accounting Series Release No. 12, 
Feb. 21, 1940. 
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mandatory periodic reports.96 Recent developments have demon-
strated the increasingly significant role of disclosure in other phases 
of security regulation, involving parties other than the issuer. Such 
regulation involves corporate insiders, broker-dealers, investment 
advisers, and other participants in the securities business. In these 
instances disclosure is not the sole regulatory device, as it is with 
issuers, but is coupled with direct requirements and prohibitions. 
This section will briefly discuss the various aspects in which dis-
closure obligations relate to parties other than issuers. 
A. Insider Transactions 
Prior to the securities acts, a corporate official who made use of 
inside information in his personal stock transactions was relatively 
safe. He could usually be held liable for damages only if an in-
vestor could prove all the elements of a fraud action, including the 
giving of a false or misleading statement, actual misuse of the in-
formation, and damages.97 
In many jurisdictions there has developed a positive duty on 
the part of directors to disclose pertinent information, particularly 
in cases involving purchases from existing shareholders. In some 
instances this duty is absolute, and in others the duty exists de-
pending on the "special facts" of the particular case.98 Even in 
the jurisdictions where a duty of positive disclosure is established, 
it is still necessary for a plaintiff to prove his reliance and damages. 
If the plaintiff has purchased or sold on an exchange this proof is 
an almost impossible task.99 
The securities acts meet the problem of insider transactions in 
two ways: (I) section 16 of the Exchange Act requires insiders to 
disclose all transactions in stock of their own companies, and at-
tempts to deter any turnover of stock by an insider within a six-
month period;100 (2) fraud provisions of the Securities Act and 
the Exchange Act require disclosure of inside information prior to 
any transaction.101 
96 The obligations of corporate disclosure rest on others also, such as controlling 
persons and underwriters acting on behalf of the company. Securities Act §§ 4, 5, 48 Stat. 
77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 77e (1958). 
97 See PROSSER, TORTS § 87 (2d ed. 1955). 
98 For discussion of these views and citation of relevant cases, see BAKER &: CARY, 
CORPORATIONS 525-35 (1959); 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 55, at 1446-48; Hill, The Sale of 
Controlling Shares, 70 HARv. L. REv. 986 (1957). 
99 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). See also note 
111 infra. 
100 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1958). 
101 The anti-fraud provisions are Securities Act § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. 
1964] DISCLOSURE 633 
Each officer, director, or beneficial owner of more than ten 
percent of any listed security is required to file with the Commis-
sion an initial statement of his holdings in all equity securities of 
the company. Thereafter, monthly reports must be filed reflecting 
any change in his holdings. The Commission publishes each 
month an Official Summary of Security Transactions and Holdings 
summarizing the transactions included in all the various owner-
ship reports filed that month. The regular circulation of this 
publication exceeds 16,000 copies monthly. In addition, all filed 
reports are available for inspection at the Commission and at the 
exchanges.102 The publicity given these reports by the financial 
press enables investors to be informed of management's attitude 
toward its company. Substantial purchases and sales must usually 
be explained. The net result is that most insiders of listed com-
panies do relatively little trading in their own securities.103 
There are specific prohibitions in addition to the required 
disclosures. Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act discourages all 
transactions by an insider in which a purchase and sale, or sale 
and purchase, take place within a six-month period, for it provides 
for the recovery by or on behalf of the corporation of all profits 
realized. This twofold approach is an example of how disclosure 
can be supplemented to meet a particular regulatory problem. 
The automatic recovery of short-swing profits does serve to pre-
vent the more egregious forms of abuse by insiders, though it is 
a crude tool which still creates numerous problems.104 Allowing 
the corporation to recover can be justified on practical grounds, 
and also on the theory that an officer or director making use of 
inside information is taking a corporate opportunity and should 
disgorge his profits.1011 
§ 77q (1958), Securities Exchange Act §§ lO(b), 15(c)(l), 48 Stat. 891, 895 (1934), as 
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 780 (1958), Rule l0b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (1949), and Rule 
15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1949). Section 15(c)(l) and Rule 15cl-2 apply just to 
broker-dealers, while the others apply to "any persons." 
102 See discussion, Special Study pt. 3, at 15. More than 400 copies of the Official 
Summaries are received by the press, libraries, and other sources of public distribution. 
103 This undocumented opinion is based on a review of numerous published Official 
Summaries of Holdings and Transactions. 
104 Section 16(c) prohibits all short selling by insiders. For discussion of § 16, see 
2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 55, at 1037-1132; Painter, The Evolving Role of Section 16(b), 
62 MICH. L. REv. 649 (1964). See also Cook &: Feldman, Insider Trading Under the 
Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv. L. REv. 385 (1953). 
1011 See testimony of Commissioner Canson Purcell, Hearings Before the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1256-57 (1942). This 
theory is somewhat weak in that at common law there was generally no liability to 
the corporation unless the purchases were extensive. See BAKER &: CARY, op. cit. supra 
note 98, at 535-36. It has been suggested with increasing frequency that the Commission 
is the proper party to bring actions under § 16(b). 
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Purchases and sales within a six-month period are presumed to 
be motivated by inside information. However, if it can be proved 
that inside information was used in any transaction, the insider 
has violated the fraud provisions of the securities acts and sec-
tion 16(b) need not be used. The regulations under the fraud 
provisions provide that it is unlawful in connection with any pur-
chase or sale in interstate commerce "to make any untrue statement 
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading."100 This 
restriction nominally applies to any person, but in practice has 
been used only against corporate insiders and broker-dealers.107 In 
addition to the regular criminal penalties, the courts have per-
mitted private parties to use these sections as the basis for civil 
liability.108 In respect to corporate insiders, the affirmative re-
quirement to disclose has been held to extend to anything which 
affects the value of the security and which is known to the insider, 
but not to the other party. Private recoveries have been obtained 
in numerous cases where common-law fraud principles would not 
have imposed a duty to disclose.109 
The principal limitation on private sanctions is the immense 
problem of establishing a basis for recovery when the transactions 
of the insider or the uninformed investor take place on an ex-
change. The recent Cady, Roberts & Co. case110 makes it clear that 
the obligation to disclose applies to exchange transactions. In 
this case the party making use of inside information was a broker-
dealer, and the sanction was a revocation proceeding by the Com-
mission. The difficulty of determining the extent of damages and 
100 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5(2) (1949). Similar language is present in § 17a and Rule 
15c·l·2. The anti-fraud provisions also make unlawful any purchase or sale by means 
of a scheme to defraud, or any act or practice or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit on customers, or by means of any other manipulative 
or fraudulent device. 
101 Actions for failure to disclose have been brought only against parties who would 
qualify as insiders under § 16 of the Exchange Act. Cady, Roberts &: Co., SEC Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 6668, Nov. 8, 1961, is the first instance of the expansion of 
the duty to one who has obtained information from an insider. See Comment, Insider 
Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 
U. CHI. L. REV. 121 (1962); 60 MICH. L. REV. 651 (1962). 
10s Exchange Act § 32, 48 Stat. 904 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1958). 3 
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1449 (2d ed. Supp. 1962), cites a total of 14 criminal cases 
under lOb-5. For review of the cases involving an implied private remedy, see North, 
Implied Civil Liability Cases Under the Federal Securities Laws, Corporate Practice 
Commentator, May 1962, p. 1. 
109 See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica, 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). See also the cases 
collected in Comment, supra note 107, at 129 nn.45-46, 130 n.47. 
110 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, Nov. 8, 1961. 
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the proper plaintiffs makes doubtful the development of effective 
private sanctions for exchange transactions by insiders.111 
The principal protection against the exploitation of inside 
information is to obtain immediate and full disclosure from com-
panies. The reporting requirements of the Exchange Act dis-
cussed above serve this purpose. In addition, most Exchange rules 
require prompt disclosure of any development "which might affect 
security values or influence investment decisions of stockholders 
or the investing public."112 Similar rules should be developed for 
the over-the-counter market.113 Section 16 of the Exchange Act, 
by requiring disclosure of transactions and the forfeiting of short-
swing profits, does aid in preventing the more obvious forms of 
abuse, and these provisions should be extended to insiders of over-
the-counter companies.114 
B. Broker-Dealers 
Broker-dealers play many roles, and their duties of disclosure 
depend on which is involved. As an underwriter or in selling new 
issues, the broker-dealer is acting on behalf of the issuer and under 
the Securities Act has the same duty as the issuer to provide a 
prospectus to every purchaser during the distribution. If the 
broker-dealer is an officer, director, or beneficial owner of ten 
percent of any listed security, he must disclose his own transactions. 
If he is an insider, or has access to inside information, he is subject 
to the disclosure provisions of the fraud regulations. This sub-
section concerns the disclosures required of broker-dealers acting 
111 If privity is required, then there is a difficult problem of tracing shares, and a 
basic unfairness in that the plaintiff will be determined by the chance of certificate 
distribution in the clearing house. If no privity is required, then any party who has 
made a stock transaction during the period the information was withheld is a po-
tential plaintiff. For example, in the Cady, Roberts case the broker, Gintel received 
information that Curtiss-Wright reduced its dividend at about 11:00 a.m. on November 
25, 1959. The news did not appear on the Dow-Jones ticker until ll:48 a.m. During 
the interval Gintel sold about 7,000 shares of Curtiss-Wright. Gintel sold for about $40 
a share and the stock closed for the day at about $34 a share. During the following 
year the price of Curtiss-Wright stock dropped to a low of $14 a share. Is there a re-
covery due anyone who purchases shares between ll:00 a.m. and ll:48 a.m. who had 
no knowledge of the reduced dividend, or is the recovery to be limited only to the 
purchaser who received the actual shares sold by Gintel? If a proper plaintiff is deter-
mined how are his damages to be measured? There do not appear to be satisfactory 
answers to these questions. 
112 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL A20-22. It is reported that the 
.American Stock Exchange has a similar policy. See Special Study pt. 3, at 98 n.187. 
113 It is reported that since September 1962 the NASD has imposed a similar require-
ment of prompt disclosure for all companies appearing on the national and regional 
retail quotation lists. See id. pt. 2, at 631. 
114 These measures are included in the recommendations of the Special Study and 
proposed legislation. See note 70 supra. 
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other than in the above roles. As mentioned earlier, the broker-
dealer is subject to numerous regulations requiring certain conduct 
and prohibiting other actions; disclosure, while important, is only 
part of his total obligation.115 
In most instances, a broker-dealer acts as an agent for a cus-
tomer in the purchase or sale of securities. Assuming that (1) the 
customer approaches the broker without solicitation, (2) cash is 
paid and the securities are immediately delivered, and (3) the 
· transaction takes place on an exchange, the minimum obligation 
of the broker-dealer is to execute the transaction quickly, report 
the market price, and collect his disclosed commission.116 The 
three assumptions above, however, are vital in determining the 
broker-dealer's duties: (1) Brokers are generally salesmen, and as 
such they recommend and tout particular securities. In many 
instances the broker is acting as an investment adviser for the cus-
tomer. (2) The relationship of the parties may be more complex. 
For example, the broker may act as bailee for securities and cash of 
the customer; the broker may have discretion in handling the ac-
count of the customer; or the broker may be a creditor of the 
customer where securities are held in a margin account. (3) The 
security may be purchased not on an exchange, but in the over-
the-counter market. 
The Special Study reported that less than half the dollar vol-
ume of customer purchases in the over-the-counter market are 
made through broker-dealers as agents. In the majority of trans-
actions the customer is purchasing from the dealer as a principal.117 
This occurs when the selling dealer has the security in his inven-
tory, or when he purchases from another dealer as a principal, then 
reselling to his customer.118 
Under agency concepts, as the broker-dealer increases his in-
volvement with a customer (as in the first or second circumstances 
above), his duties of disclosure increase; but if he acts as a principal 
and not an agent he has no duties of disclosure beyond avoidance 
115 See Comment, 62 MICH, L. REv. 680, 730 (1964). 
116 In addition, the broker-dealer has the duties of any agent, such as the obligation 
to disclose any personal interest in conflict with interests of his customer. See REsTATE-
MENT, AGENCY § 23 (1958). 
117 In terms of numbers of shares, 61% of th.e purchases were made through broker-
dealers as agent. Special Study pt. 2, at 612. 
118 In this latter situation the broker-dealer will purchase the security from a whole-
saler at the wholesale price and resell to his customer at a "mark-up" over his cost. The 
broker-dealer does not confirm the transaction to the customer -until he has purchased 
the security. This kind of principal transaction is called "riskless," as the risks of owner-
ship are absent. Id. at 611. 
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of fraud. The basic obligations required of any agent are still 
important with respect to broker-dealers, but they have been sup-
plemented from two sources: specific requirements of the Exchange 
Act and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, and the devel-
opment by case decisions of responsibilities based on the status of 
broker-dealers. 
The specific disclosure obligations found in the Exchange Act 
and its accompanying regulations are primarily expressions of 
normal agency duties. Their importance is that they apply to 
any broker-dealer, even when he is acting as a principal in an 
over-the-counter transaction. Regulations under section 15 of 
the Exchange Act provide that a broker-dealer must disclose, in 
any purchase or sale in the over-the-counter market, whether he 
is acting as a broker or as a dealer for his own account.U9 If the 
broker-dealer is acting as a broker he must disclose the amount 
of commission.120 Other rules require a broker-dealer to make 
appropriate disclosure to his customer if he is controlled by or 
in a control position of the issuer of any security in which he 
is effecting a transaction, 121 and to inform any customer he advises 
on securities for a fee of any interest he has in any distribution of 
securities concerning which he is advising.122 There are in addi-
tion the general fraud provisions.123 
Under these regulations promulgated pursuant to the Exchange 
Act, the broker-dealer must disclose to his customer the amount of 
his commission if he acts as a broker in the purchase or sale of 
over-the-counter securities. In a transaction on an exchange, the 
price and amount of commission must also be disclosed. However, 
in over-the-counter transactions, where the broker-dealer is acting 
as a dealer, only this fact must be disclosed. The dealer has no 
duty to disclose his costs or the amount of mark-up he charges his 
customer; many times the customer has no way of determining 
110 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-1(4) (1949), applies to over-the-counter transactions. See also 
Exchange Act § ll(d)(2), 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1958), which contains a 
similar rule for exchange transactions. 
120 This is made specific only for over-the-counter transactions. Rule 15c-1(4), 17 
C.F.R. § 240.15c-1(4) (1949). The exchanges themselves require disclosure of commissions. 
121 Exchange Act Rule 15c-1(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-1(5) (1949). 
122 Exchange Act Rule 15c-1(6), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-1(6) (1949). Other disclosures 
are required in specific circumstances. For example, Rule 15c-1(7)(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-
1(7) (1949), requires recording of transactions in discretionary accounts; Rule 15c-2(1), 17 
C.F.R. § 240.15c-2(1) (1949), and Rule Sc-I, 17 C.F.R. § 240.Sc-l (1949), require certain dis-
closures when customers' securities are hypothecated; and Rule lOb-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-7 
(Cum. Supp. 1963), requires disclosure of stabilizing transactions made to facilitate a 
distribution. 
123 See notes 101 8: 106 supra. 
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whether the transaction took place at the current market price.12' 
It was to meet this problem that the Commission originally devel-
oped the "shingle theory" of broker-dealer obligation. This duty 
to customers is not based on the presence of an agency, but on the 
professional status of the broker-dealer. When a broker-dealer 
"hangs out his shingle" he is said to undertake an obligation to his 
customer higher than that of an ordinary salesman.125 This higher 
standard is similar to the obligations long imposed on attorneys, 
doctors, certified public accountants, and architects in dealing with 
their customers.126 Recent cases have applied the same concept 
to insurance salesmen by requiring that the insurance be suitable 
for the customer, and that the insurance salesman disclose the basis 
for his opinion regarding the desirability of the policies recom-
mended.127 
In regard to broker-dealers, the shingle theory first took the 
form of requiring that the price of securities be reasonably related 
to current market value even when the broker-dealer was selling as 
a principal; thus an unreasonable mark-up is fraudulent unless 
disclosed.128 The shingle theory has since been applied to prohibit 
(1) unauthorized transactions in a customer's account,120 (2) un-
authorized pledging of a customer's securities,130 (3) the accepting 
of a customer's securities without disclosing insolvency,131 and (4) 
failure to deliver securities promptly.132 Instead of resting these 
duties on an agency basis, the Commission has applied them to all 
broker-dealers regardless of the capacity in which they are acting. 
While a broker-dealer cannot charge an unreasonable mark-up, 
124 Proposed Rule X-15c-1(10) Ouly 29, 1942) would have required dealers to disclose 
in all transactions the best independent bid and offer obtainable in the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence. The proposed rule was withdrawn (SEC Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 3940, April 2, 1947) because of pressure from the securities industry and court 
approval of the "shingle theory" in Charles Hughes &: Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944). See Special Study pt. 2, ch. VII-D for criticism 
relating to the lack of customer knowledge about the quality of the markets and the 
executions of transactions. 
125 "Even considering petitioner as a principal in a simple vendor purchaser trans-
action ... it was still under a special duty in view of its expert knowledge and prof-
fered advice .••• " Charles Hughes &: Co. v. SEC, supra note 124, at 436-38. 
126 See MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY § 525 (4th ed. 1952). 
127 See Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961); Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 
879 (W.D. Wash. 1961). 
12s Charles Hughes &: Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 
786 (1944). See also Duker v. Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939). 
129 See, e.g., First Anchorage Corp., 34 S.E.C. 299 (1952). 
130 See, e.g., Richard A. Sebastian, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5876, 
Feb. 12, 1959. 
131 See, e.g., SEC v. C. H. Abraham & Co., 186 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
132 See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6778, April 16, 1962. 
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there is still no absolute requirement that the amount of mark-up 
be disclosed.133 Currently the broker-dealer discloses his costs and 
profit if he decides to act as broker (agent), but not if he acts as 
dealer (principal). This is not a satisfactory situation, and in every 
instance the customer should be informed of the amount of mark-
up or commission. The investor always considers his broker-
dealer as working for him, and the mechanics of the trading process 
should not prevent the investor from receiving the basic informa-
tion relating to price and costs.134 
As the relationship between broker-dealer and customer be-
comes closer, the obligations of the broker-dealer should increase. 
For example, a phenomenon of recent origin is the depositing by 
customers of large quantities of fully paid securities and cash with 
broker-dealers. These securities are usually in the street name of 
a broker-dealer. With few exceptions, broker-dealers make use of 
these securities and cash in their normal operations, and no segre-
gation of accounts is maintained. Customer account balances are 
a source of free money, as most broker-dealers pay no interest to 
customers for its use. As a minimum, a broker-dealer should pro-
vide his customer with periodic statements of transactions, in-
cluding a report of the extent to which the broker-dealer has used 
the customer's assets. An explanation of the potential risks in case 
of broker-dealer insolvency should also be provided.135 
Under the general fraud provisions, a broker-dealer must dis-
close material facts needed to make a statement not misleading. 
The most important current questions concerning broker-dealers 
center on what a broker-dealer must disclose beyond what is 
required by the fraud provisions. Must a broker-dealer inform a 
customer that a particular security is not suitable for his pur-
133 In Arleen W. Hughes, 27 S.E.C. 629, 952 (1948), the Commission held there was 
a positive duty to disclose actual cost and the amount of mark-up. This duty arose 
because the broker-dealer was acting as an investment adviser and thus was held to 
be in a fiduciary capacity, requiring her to fulfill the obligations of an agent even 
though as a broker-dealer she sold as a principal. At one time the Commission went 
further and held that "riskless transactions" (see note 118 supra) would be treated as 
agency transactions. Oxford Co., 21 S.E.C. 681 (1946). The Commission has not con-
tinued to maintain this position. 
1s, The Special Study recommendation in this area was that all "riskless transactions" 
be handled on an agency basis. Special Study pt. 2, at 676. In addition, the Special Study 
urged wider dissemination of wholesale quotations of bid and asked prices, and new NASD 
standards relating to the execution of orders and the amount of mark-up. 
135 For a general discussion of the handling of customer's accounts and the potential 
risks to customers, see id. pt. 1, at 387-416. The recent insolvency of two New York Stock 
Exchange Members-Ira Haupt 8: Co. and J. R. Williston 8: Beane-provides an un• 
fortunate example of the potential_ danger to investors. 
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chase? Must a broker-dealer furnish a current financial statement 
to customers for any security he recommends? Must a broker-dealer 
reveal the basis or lack of basis for his opinion about a security? 
Several recent decisions by the Commission and the courts seem 
to answer these questions in the affirmative.136 These obligations 
rest on a broker-dealer qua broker-dealer-a duty owed to the 
public because of his status. The defining and cataloguing of these 
obligations which is currently taking place is the most far-reaching 
development in securities regulations since the passage of the 
original acts. It is tied to a recognition of the need for increased 
professionalism on the part of broker-dealers and the need for 
higher broker-dealer qualifications. It is also part of the increased 
emphasis on the trading aspects of securities regulation as opposed 
to the distribution aspects. The role of disclosure is properly ex-
panding from obligations imposed on the issuers of securities to 
obligations imposed on the broker-dealers who deal directly with 
the investor. 
C. Investment Advisers and Corporate Publicity 
Many problems surrounding the giving of investment advice 
and the dissemination of corporate publicity were stressed in the 
report of the Special Study.137 They involve a variety of special 
situations, and the recommendations were primarily directed 
toward self-regulatory agencies.138 Although not articulated as 
such, the principal shortcomings involved lack of disclosure. An 
investment adviser who holds himself out to the public as an 
expert in investment analysis should be held to minimum standards 
of competence and performance. The public is entitled to good 
faith opinions based on his independent research, or to be informed 
136 "There is inherent in the dealer-customer relationship the implied representation 
that the customer will be dealt with honestly and fairly and that the representations 
respecting a stock which the dealer recommends are reasonably made on the basis of 
knowledge and careful consideration." In the Matter of Heft, Kahn &: Infante, Inc., SEC 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7020, Feb. 11, 1963. See also Berko v. SEC, 297 
F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1961); Herring v. Hendison, 62 Civil No. 1540, S.D.N.Y., May 9, 1963; 
MacRobbins &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962; In 
the Matter of Brown, Barton &: Engel, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6821, 
June 8, 1962; SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445, Feb. 2, 1962 (dealing with distribution 
of -unregistered securities by broker-dealers). 
137 Special Study pt. 1, at 330-87. 
138 The exchanges and the NASD were encouraged to establish rules and practices 
in respect to broker-dealers who give investment advice, and it was recommended that 
registered investment advisers other than broker-dealers be organized into self-regulatory 
organizations. Special Study pt. I, at 387. The New York Stock Exchange is reported to 
have issued new rules governing member firms' market letters, research reports, and 
advertising. The Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1963, p. 9, cols. 2-3. 
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that no such research has been performed. For example, an in-
vestment adviser should disclose whether he has a personal interest 
in a security which he recommends. The customer of the invest-
ment adviser needs this information in order properly to weigh 
an opinion of the adviser which might be influenced by such a 
personal interest. 
The registered investment adviser's duty to disclose the fact 
that he has taken a position in securities which he recommends 
was definitely established by the Supreme Court in its recent 
opinion in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.139 The opin-
ion discusses at length various views on the role of the investment 
adviser, and includes quotations from the Code of Ethics and 
Standards of Practice of one of the investment counsel associa-
tions.139a The result is a finding of a "fiduciary relationship" be-
tween investment adviser and client, and a failure to disclose 
potential conflicting financial interests is fraudulent. 
"An adviser who, like respondents, secretly trades on the 
market effect of his own recommendation, may be motivated 
--consciously or unconsciously-to recommend a given secur-
ity not because of its potential for long-run price increase 
(which would profit the client), but because of its potential 
for short-run price increase in response to anticipated activity 
from the recommendation (which would profit the adviser). 
An investor seeking the advice of a registered investment ad-
viser must, if the legislative purpose is to be served, be per-
mitted to evaluate such overlapping motivations, through 
appropriate disclosure, in deciding whether an adviser is serv-
ing 'two masters' or only one, 'especially ... if one of the 
masters happens to be economic self interest.' " 139b 
The language of the opinion gives support to the recent Commis-
sion decisions on the positive obligations of broker-dealer, discussed 
above, 139c and serves notice that higher standards of conduct based 
on the "professional responsibility" of broker-dealers and invest-
ment advisers will be expected. 
Many investment advisers make use of material furnished by 
the corporation recommended. This obviously is an important 
source, but if the investment adviser's recommendation is based 
only on such data, with no independent checking or analysis, this 
deficiency should be disclosed. If an investment adviser wishes 
139 84 Sup. Ct. 275 (1963). 
130a Id. at 277-85. 
189b Jd. at 285. 
1soc See note 136 supra. 
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to give recommendations based on astrology, the sticking of pins 
into the financial pages, or which company provides him with free 
trips to Florida, this probably should be allowed. The basic need 
is for the public to be informed of the research techniques used 
and the basis of the recommendations. The theoretical justifica-
tion for imposition of a duty to disclose is the same as that discussed 
above-a type of shingle theory. Registration as an investment 
adviser imposes a duty to disclose material facts affecting the in-
dependence and quality of the advice given. 
Although no registration is required of parties other than broker-
dealers and those giving investment advice for a fee,140 there is 
a need for disclosure with regard to free investment advice and 
financial information in the public press. Considerable concern 
was expressed after the revelation by the Special Study that a finan-
cial editor of a national magazine had purchased shares immedi-
ately prior to the publication of a favorable article concerning the 
company.141 The real concern here is not that one individual 
made a profit through his position, but that readers of the publica-
tion were misled into believing that the story was an unbiased 
product. Readers are similarly misled if a story in an independent 
publication is planted by a company.142 
Difficult questions are involved in placing any restrictions on the 
public press. There are also problems in attempting to draw a 
line between corporate publicity intended to sell a company's 
product, and publicity intended to sell a company's stock. There 
is nothing inherently wrong with the latter, and it may be a legit-
imate corporate endeavor. The public is used to advertising, and 
can weigh material which is clearly labeled as advertising. The 
need is to insure that corporate publicity intended to advertise 
securities is clearly labeled, and is not misleading. The Commis-
sion has taken tentative steps regarding corporate publicity in-
tended to affect the price of securities by requiring certain dis-
closures by companies of the amount of money spent on such 
activities. This is of some help, and could be expanded by re-
quiring continuous disclosure of these expenditures in the annual 
reports. There may also be a need for a tighter fraud statute 
directed against companies which publish misleading information 
affecting the price of their securities.143 What is also needed, how-
140 Investment Advisers Act § 3, 54 Stat. 850 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1958). 
141 See special Study pt. 3, at 73-75. 
142 Cf. 16 C.F.R. § 13.10 (1960), the Federal Trade Commission rule against adver-
tising falsely or misleadingly. 
143 See the recommendations of the Special Study pt. 3, at 102. 
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ever, is extension of minimum obligations of disclosure to all par-
ties giving investment advice, and to the financial press. The ex-
isting fraud provisions should be enforced against these parties, 
and any new fraud statute should expressly include them.144 
D. Disclosure of Market Data 
Market data includes both daily market information on par-
ticular securities (e.g., price and volume of shares traded) and 
information which is published in aggregated form for a period 
of time (e.g., monthly reports of short positions, monthly odd 
lot transactions, monthly customer debit and credit balances, week-
ly reports of round lot sales).145 Such data is necessary to enable 
the investor to evaluate the market price of particular securities, 
as well as the general tone and level of the market. In addition, 
disclosures of market data aid in the prevention of manipulation, 
for enforcement officials can thus locate and check unusual market 
behavior.146 
Beyond the general provisions which require broker-dealers 
to keep such books and records as the Commission may prescribe,147 
there is no specific requirement that broker-dealers furnish market 
data. The only direct reference to the reporting of market data 
is in connection with exchange rules. The Commission is to regis-
ter an exchange only upon the finding that it has rules "just and 
adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors."148 Spe-
cifically, the Commission is given authority to promulgate rules 
for an exchange concerning "the reporting of transactions on the 
exchange and upon tickers maintained by or with the consent of 
the exchange including the method of reporting short sales, stopped 
sales, sales of securities of issuers in default, bankruptcy or receiv-
144 See In the Matter of Carvalho, d/b/a Capital Investment Co., SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 7129, Aug. 29, 1963 (broker-dealer held in violation of § I0b-5 
Exchange Act for financial public relations activities); SEC v. Chamberlain Associates, 
Civil No. 61-2150, S.D.N.Y., May 16, 1963 (Company "Financial Public Relations Counsel" 
who had responsibility for passing stock to the public held in violation of § 17(a) of 
Securities Act). 
H5 Special Study Table VI-91, pt. 2, at 429. The Special Study listed about twenty 
reports that are being filed on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis with the New York 
Stock Exchange. In almost all instances only aggregate data is published. 
HO Some reports, such as floor traders' reports, are designed specifically for surveil-
lance. In other instances, such as the tape-watching program of the exchanges and the 
Commission, regulatory purposes are an important by-product. For any market study, 
such as that attempted by the Special Study for the period of the market break of 1962, 
reported data is indispensable. See Special Study pt. 4, at 815-957. 
147 Exchange Act § 17a, 48 Stat. 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1958). Reports of sta-
bilizing activities (Rule 17a-2), and an annual report of financial condition (Rule 17a-5, 
Form X-17A-5) are required under this section. In addition, broker-dealers must keep 
detailed records of transactions and accounts (Rule 17a-3). 
HS Exchange Act § 6d, 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1958). 
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ership, and sales involving other special circumstances. . . ."149 
Currently, the only source of daily market data for individual 
stocks are the exchange ticker tapes and the clearing house reports. 
The Special Study criticized exchange reporting as neither pro-
viding an accurate measure of volume nor enabling the check-
ing of individual transactions.150 The reconstruction of the trading 
even in a single stock for one day is almost impossible. Tape data 
is incomplete, for certain trades of specialists are not included, and 
there is no way to identify individual firms which are participating, 
or whether sales are long or short. There is no way to determine 
the actual time of a transaction;151 at best, only a sequence is possi-
ble, and as activity increases, accuracy decreases. Individual trans-
actions must be traced through the clearing house data, which is a 
difficult and time-consuming task.152 
The Special Study recommended that the exchanges attempt 
to improve the accuracy and coverage of their reporting of market 
transactions, and suggested that the reporting be done at the point 
of execution by each member.153 This is a sound approach. Cur-
rent electronic data processing equipment can easily digest the 
information coming from the individual broker. If all trades were 
recorded, it would be possible to trace an order back to its source 
and to determine price, time, and identification of the investor. 
Broker-dealers already maintain records of transactions, and the 
obligation to report individual transactions can be justified as part 
of their general duty as licensed broker-dealers.154 
The reporting of general market data currently provided by 
weekly and monthly reports could also be improved. Better inte-
gration of these reports is needed, and important additions should 
149 Exchange Act § 19b(8), 48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1958). 
150 Special Study pt. 2, at 351-58. See also id. pt. 4, at 815-957. The reconstruction of 
the market break data involved months of work and hours of computer time. Even with 
this, it represented only an estimate. 
151 Only secondary sources are available, and these are not complete or consistent. 
In order to identify participants, clearing house data must be used; to determine the 
time of each transaction the exchange uses odd-lot records. These records show tape 
time, which makes them difficult to integrate with the specialists' reports, which show 
actual time. See id. pt. 2, at 355-56. 
152 Clearing house data originates from members' reports of transactions which are 
cleared, and there is no requirement that all transactions go through the clearinghouse. 
Ibid. 
153 Id. at 357-58. 
154 Direct reporting of transactions would involve more record keeping for floor 
members and new procedures for reporting for all broker-dealers. These added duties 
are justified under the Exchange Act as being "necessary or appropriate for the protec-
tion of investors or to insure fair dealing in securities traded upon such exchange •••• " 
48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1958). The duties to report market data could also 
be justified under the "shingle theory." 
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be made to the material reported.155 In certain technical areas, 
such as trading by members and specialist activities, more compre-
hensive and detailed reports are needed.156 
While improvements are needed in the reporting of trans-
actions on exchange markets, a whole new system of reporting 
should be considered for the over-the-counter market. There are 
no records of volume or price of trades in particular securities. 
There are no regular reports of general market data. The public 
has, at best, retail quotations which do not represent actual trans-
actions, but are only "a guide to the range within which these 
securities could have been sold or bought at the time of computa-
tion."157 As discussed above, in many instances an investor cannot 
determine market value, and it is impossible to judge the quality 
or depth of any particular market.158 
The problem of obtaining market data in the over-the-counter 
market is complex. Pursuant to recommendations of the Special 
Study, the Commission and the NASD are currently working to 
develop an improved system for quotations.159 This is an im-
portant step, but an immediate effort should also be directed to-
ward the broader goal. The individual broker-dealer should re-
port not only quotations, but also the details of each transaction. 
Modern electronic data processing equipment makes possible a 
reporting system for over-the-counter transactions that could equal 
that of the major exchanges. 
155 There is need to coordinate the filing of reports, and to reduce the time lag 
between the time of filing and publication. Specific recommendations in respect to re-
ports of members' trading and specialists' activities were made in Special Study pt. 2, at 
162-70, 238-42, 246. 
156 A related problem of disclosure involves the specialist's book. The book contains 
the accumulation of market and limit orders for purchases and sales. The orders usually 
have time limits as well as price limits. Section 11 of the Exchange Act forbids the 
specialist to disclose the contents of his book to a limited number of people because 
knowledge of its contents gives a competitive advantage, 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78k (1958). There is no statutory restriction, however, preventing disclosure to all 
members of the exchange and to the public. The Special Study discussed the problem 
(pt. 2, at 71-78) but did not satisfactorily answer the question of why full publicity should 
not be given to orders in the hands of the specialist if the desire is for a free and open 
market. The need for the specialist to keep his book private has not been shown, and 
unless such a showing is made, steps should be taken to make use of improved methods 
of communication in order to disclose pending orders fully. 
157 This caption is required by the NASD to be placed above retail quotations 
published by the press. 
158 The problems of market data in the over-the-counter market include the diffi-
culties of the investor in determining the broker-dealers cost and mark-up. See Part 
IV(C) supra. Currently, the investor does not even have data showing the number of 
broker-dealers willing to trade a particular security, as the wholesale quotations are not 
generally available. See the discussion in the Special Study pt. 2, at 533-796, particularly 
630-58. 
1110 See Special Study pt. 2, at 590-609. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Disclosure has now been used as a method of federal regula-
tion of securities in the United States for thirty years, and any 
broad statement of evaluation must proclaim its success. This 
general accolade must be tempered, however, by a recognition 
that the effectiveness of disclosure as a method of regulation de-
pends on the specific situation in which it is used. With respect 
to initial distributions, current disclosure requirements are in-
valuable. They have not, however, prevented investors from 
losing money in the purchase of new securities. Investor losses dur-
ing the speculative activity of 1959 to 1962 were great. Improve-
ments in disclosure mechanics are needed, but even with improve-
ments, losses will probably continue. High-pressure salesmen and 
questionable tactics of various underwriters and promoters can-
not be prevented by disclosure. 
Disclosures by listed companies provide an indispensable 
reservoir of information. Disclosure plays its most effective role 
by permitting investors to evaluate securities on their merits. This 
is also the area where the need for improvement is most pressing. 
Reporting requirements should be extended to companies with 
securities traded over-the-counter, and the standards and account-
ing practices used in preparing periodic reports should be im-
proved and standardized. In addition, there is a need to integrate 
the reporting requirements of the Securities Acts and the Exchange 
Act to avoid the duplication of filed information. This would de-
crease the burden on both the companies and the Commission. 
The increased use of disclosure as a method of regulation of 
broker-dealers and other participants in the securities markets 
is an important recent development. New obligations owed to-
ward investors are in a period of rapid growth. These obliga-
tions do not rest on a formal agency or contract relationship, but 
arise because of the "professional" status of the broker-dealer. 
Direct restrictions play a part in these obligations, but the recent 
developments primarily involve new duties of disclosure which 
should be encouraged and developed by the Commission. 
These concluding statements summarize the preceding eval-
uation of the role of disclosure in securities regulation. It is a 
role of unparalleled importance. To complete the picture, how-
ever, mention must be made of a by-product of corporate disclo-
sure. This is the role of disclosure as a method of regulation of the 
internal affairs of a corporation. 
During the past thirty years, there has been increasing con-
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cern over the power and influence of the large publicly owned 
corporation.160 It is frequently stated that the large corporation 
has an obligation not only to its shareholders, but also to its em-
ployees, its consumers, and the community in which it operates.161 
The officers and directors of large corporations have been com-
pared to public officials, and numerous writers have expressed 
concern as to how best to enforce these broad responsibilities of 
corporate management.162 The subject is too broad for this paper, 
but any evaluation of disclosure in securities regulation must 
acknowledge that the disclosures required by the securities acts 
enable employees, consumers, and the general public to obtain 
information and thus exercise pressure on corporate behavior. 
For example, the amount executives pay themselves in compensa-
tion is of interest to labor groups and the general community, as 
well as investors. The required disclosure of this compensation 
certainly influences the level paid.163 Likewise, the required dis-
closure of possible conflicts of interest by officers and directors 
serves to prevent their occurrence. Mr. Justice Frankfurter de-
scribed this role of disclosure as follows: 
"The existence of bonuses, of excessive commissions and 
salaries, of preferential lists and the like, may be all open 
secrets among the knowing, but the knowing are few. There 
is a shrinking quality to such transactions; to force the knowl-
edge of them into the open is largely to restrain their hap-
pening. Many practices safely pursued in private lose their 
justification in public. Thus social standards newly defined 
gradually established themselves as new business habits."164 
One unanswered question, however, is whether the securities 
laws can be properly used to force additional corporate disclosures 
160 BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MoNEY (1914), raised the question, but modern dis-
cussions usually start with BERLE &: MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY (1932), and Temporary National Economic Committee, Final Report and Recom-
mendations, S. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). 
161 See BAKER, DIRECTORS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS 138 (1945). Note the similar state-
ments of director responsibilities taken from annual reports of large corporations quoted 
in BAKJ:R &: CARY, CORPORATIONS 163 (3d ed. 1959). 
162 A good summary of recent material is in Manne, Current Views on the Modern 
Corporation, 38 U. DET. L.J. 559 (1961). 
163 "It is the salaries of a few top corporate executives as much as anything else 
that confirms the worker in his opposition to profit as 'exploitation' and in his convic-
tion that profits must be exorbitant. Every study shows that far from being petty, this 
resentment is a major factor in industrial conflict." DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY 92-94, 
251 (1950). On the effect of disclosure on executive compensation, see I WASHINGTON 
&: ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 27-28 (3d ed. 1962). 
164' The quotation appears in an excellent discussion on the value of expanded dis-
closure in Cary, The Case for Higher Corporate Standards, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 
1962, p. 53. 
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which may be in the public interest, yet which cannot be justi-
fied as necessary for the protection of investors. 
The Commission may require a corporation, as a requisite 
for listing on an exchange, to disclose such information "as nec-
essary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors .... "165 The Commission may also require information 
in periodic reports "as necessary or appropriate for the proper 
protection of investors and to insure fair dealing in the securi-
ties"166 and may prescribe the content of proxy statements "as 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors."167 Is the different language used in these sec-
tions intentional? For example, would it be proper for the Com-
mission to require that every proxy statement for an annual 
meeting list the number of Negro employees? This information 
might be important to the community in order for it to judge 
whether the company is meeting its responsibilities toward end-
ing discrimination, yet it could be argued that it is not informa-
tion needed to protect investors. 
Aside from corporate and securities areas, disclosure as a 
method of regulation is receiving increasing recognition. It is 
seen as a means of preventing conflicts of interest involving gov-
ernment employees, 168 and as the remedy for deceptive packag-
ing169 and hidden costs in borrowing money.170 Disclosure is not 
an effective regulatory device in all circumstances and, as evi-
denced by recent attempts to force organizations such as the 
NAACP to disclose membership lists, cannot be used indiscrimi-
nately.171 In the area of securities regulation, it has proved its value. 
As a method of regulation of corporate behavior, disclosure offers 
the best available means of achieving desired results without the 
restrictiveness of direct regulatory control. To be effective, how-
ever, disclosure requirements should be specifically imposed as 
needed for corporate regulation. Disclosure for this purpose 
should not be limited merely to the by-products of that required 
for securities regulation. 
165 Exchange Act § 12b(l), 48 Stat. 892 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1958). 
166 Exchange Act § 13a, 48 Stat. 894 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1958). 
167 Exchange Act § 14d, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1958). 
168 See PREVENTING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF SPECIAL GOVERNMENT 
EMPLOYEES (1963). The Case-Neuberger bill (entitled: a bill to promote public confidence 
in the integrity of Congress and the executive branch) calls for financial disclosures by 
congressmen and members of the executive branch. S.1261, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). 
169 S. 387, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). 
170 S. 758, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). 
171 Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960). See also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 
60 (1960). For a discussion of limitations of disclosure as a regulatory device, see Com• 
ment, Disclosure as a Legislative Device, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1273 (1963). 
